A particularly refreshing feature of *Cultural Diversity in Organizations* is that, even though its subject matter easily lends itself to pontification, Cox does not preach. Although he makes his views evident, he does so in a relatively objective manner. For example, he carefully avoids dwelling on moral and ethical reasons for maintaining and managing diversity, instead emphasizing the performance consequences of diversity. Also, he often acknowledges arguments and evidence that contradict his views. For instance, when he suggests that men and women are culturally distinct, he points out that others argue the opposite and that "the case for ignoring or minimizing cultural distinctions between women and men has merit" (p. 107).

Still, the book has several limitations. First, according to Cox, his primary targets are teachers and students in classes on diversity. Yet while students may relate to and be interested in discussing many of his points—e.g., cultural differences in communication style or the unfavorable portrayal of women in advertisements—the book is more research-oriented than pedagogical, lacking discussion questions, exercises, and illustrative examples that might make it more suitable for a classroom setting. Second, there are occasional awkward spots in the book's structure. For example, the topics "Can managing diversity really make a difference?" (Part One), "Remedies for Sexual Harassment" (Part Two), and "Approaches to Managing Intergroup Conflict" (Part Three) would fit more comfortably in Part Five of the book. Also, the general framework for guiding organizational change is not smoothly linked with the other portions of the text; given this weakness and—due to its generality—the framework's limited practical value, Cox might have done well to eliminate this segment of Part Five and instead expand his more relevant and practical discussion of specific tools for organizational change. Third, in an effort to cover a variety of topics, Cox inevitably sacrifices depth in places. For example, while he points out a variety of tools to promote multiculturalism in organizations, his discussion of those tools, with the exception of affirmative action, tends to be cursory.

Despite these minor shortcomings, however, Cox's book is one of the most informative and comprehensive writings available on the subject of workplace diversity. For those seeking to familiarize themselves with seminal research and current management trends in this area, *Cultural Diversity in Organizations* is a "must-read."


Reviewed by Denis Collins, University of Wisconsin, Madison

At the 1993 annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (the communitarian movement), its leader, the distinguished organiza-
tional scholar Amatai Etzioni, was asked where exactly communitarianism fell on the continuum between individualism and community conformity. His response: in countries as overly individualistic as the United States, communitarianism is on the side of community conformity; in countries as overly communal as Communist China, it is on the side of individualism. Obviously, communitarianism needs philosophical clarity and methods for deducing and evaluating policies.

I hoped that this book would solve Etzioni’s philosophical problem. It arrives with heady introductions. The inside jacket claims that "Philip Selznick’s magisterial study of moral and social theory establishes the intellectual foundations of an important new movement in American thought: communitarianism." On the back jacket, Etzioni himself declares the book "an outstanding accomplishment" and notes that "this masterful result of a lifelong study of social sciences, social philosophy, and ethics yields a book no student of our social or moral foundation, condition, and hence future can afford to miss."

Any job could highlight the natural tension between individualism and community conformity. My father worked swing shift for over thirty years on Con Edison’s emergency squad, the workforce responsible for keeping New York City electrified. Commanded by management, with the approval of his union, my father willingly worked seven consecutive days from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., took three days off, worked seven consecutive days from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., took three days off, worked seven consecutive days from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., took three days off, and started the cycle over again. For thirty years. His timing was always off. He had no family life. He tried, but the swing shift made family life a heroic effort. Was this ethical? Was my father overemphasizing conformity to the work community and underemphasizing his individualism and family? Or was management overemphasizing its own individualism in dictating worker hours and underemphasizing its role in the broader community, including my home life? A book about the philosophical foundations of communitarianism should shed some insight on ways to conceptualize and solve these types of problems.

This frustrating book fails to deliver. Selznick wrestles with such theoretical and practical issues by defining morality; applying it to individuals, institutions, and communities; and discussing their relationships. While the flow is quite logical, Selznick prefers to spend his time on abstract philosophy, obvious statements, and academic hairsplitting.

The book is divided into four parts: morality and modernity, the moral person, the moral institution, and the moral community. In Part One, we learn that there are good and bad things associated with modernity. Selznick asserts that, for the most part, "modernity weakens culture and fragments experience . . . at significant cost to the harmony and stability of human experience" (p. 8). He argues that individualism needs to be restrained or reconceptualized in light of the community by revisiting John Dewey’s pragmatism. In addition, he skips through the writings of Edmund Burke, Max Horkheimer, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Leon Trotsky, Robert Nozick, the legal positivists, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, G. W. F. Hegel, the existentialists, Max Weber, Wilhelm Dilthey, George Herbert Mead,

and Thomas S. Kuhn, among many others, without discussing any one in appropriate depth. The moral of the story—community conformity matters.

The book is filled with literally hundreds of frustratingly self-evident statements that lead nowhere, such as: "Social reality is indeed a web of meanings" (p. 89); "Every human being is unique, as is every culture. But it is just as true that people and groups are the same in important respects" (p. 104); "The idea that people are wholly determined by social experience is often an obstacle to clear thought" (p. 125). I expected a link between communitarianism and zen buddhism; the answer, shaped around paradoxical extremes, is nothing yet everything, or is it everything yet nothing, or maybe the midpoint between nothing and everything? Better yet, in countries that overemphasize everything, communitarianism is on the side of nothing; in countries that overemphasize nothing, communitarianism is on the side of everything.

There are also a few controversial statements that apparently do not need empirical verification, such as: "Conservatives worry about the social definition of poverty; radicals are more concerned about the social definition of crime" (p. 90). For those wishing to know what "reason" is, Selznick thinks he clarifies it with a five factor solution: order, principle, experience, prudence, and dialogue (p. 57). Trade-offs among these factors are, of course, important to consider.

Do not expect to learn anything new or substantive from Part Two on "The Moral Person," unless you happen to be an extreme proponent of either determinism or free will. Those who believe in determinism must realize that individualism matters, and those who believe in free will must realize that community conformity matters. The moral of the story—both individualism and community conformity matter.

Part Three, "The Moral Institution," is the section most readers will be tempted to wrestle with, as it promises to examine "the moral experience of large, special-purpose organizations" (p. 231). Here we learn the obvious, that "even so weighty an enactment as the United States Constitution cannot be understood apart from the legal and political history that preceded it, the interpretive gloss given it by the courts, and the role it has played in American history and consciousness" (p. 232). And, it is possible to conceive "corporate groups as responsible participants in a moral order" (p. 238), although "moral agency need not presuppose moral competence" (p. 239). And, "the moral premises and dilemmas of administration are corporate and collective, not merely individual" (p. 242).

Selznick promises to help the reader understand and resolve all of these moral tensions in chapters ten ("Authority and Bureaucracy") and eleven ("Management and Governance"). In chapter ten, we learn that the virtues of bureaucracy are (1) fidelity, (2) accountability, (3) consultation, and (4) mitigation of arbitrariness. We also learn a little about the "darker side" of bureaucracy; and thus, bureaucracies must go "beyond domination" (p. 286).

In chapter eleven, after many more self-evident, vacuous premises, we learn of a major Selznickian conclusion: "Managerial absolutism has no place in an organization attuned to human needs" (p. 311). Therefore, are participatory man-
agement and workplace democracy communitarian ethical imperatives? Not quite, because "in modern special-purpose institutions, the great need is cooperation, not democracy as such" (p. 317). Thus the closest Selznick comes to offering a substantial communitarian policy recommendation grounded somewhere in communitarian theory is the need for "shared governance." The only example offered is that of major universities where both faculties (workers) and administrators (managers) share governing, as if democracy in the United States (bureaucratic managers and working politicians) is not shared governance between administrators and politicians.

Part Four, on "The Moral Community" tells us nothing as well, unless one is enlightened by comments such as: "This line of argument suggests that it is as wrong to make a fetish of solidarity as it is to glorify unconditional independence" (p. 370). Naturally, Selznick would not want to impose his conclusions on the reader; he merely suggests this conclusion. He is not making the suggestion; the argument is doing the suggesting.

This conclusion brings readers full-circle to Etzioni's problem. Communitarianism remains somewhere between the extremes of total liberty and total community conformity. Maybe it is for this reason that Etzioni is telling scholars that Selznick's book is "masterful" and the publisher calls it "magisterial." (Is this a bow toward an enlightened monarchy as the preferred political system of communitarians?) It shows that Etzioni's armchair philosophizing takes one to the same exact spot as Selznick's learned analysis—somewhere between the extremes. Matters corrupted by too much individualism require more community conformity, while matters corrupted by too much community conformity require more individualism. Maybe, as an Aristotelian mean state, communitarianism is an art, not a science. As for helping my father and millions of workers like him, this book offers no philosophical clarity or methods for deducing and evaluating policies. Nonetheless, some deductions could be made regarding communitarian views on truth-in-advertising.


Reviewed by Nancy B. Kurland, University of Southern California

In 1982, Robert Kegan, currently a senior lecturer at the Harvard Graduate School of Education and a senior faculty member at the Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology, published The evolving self, outlining a subject–object relations theory of personality development. A student of Lawrence Kohlberg's and influenced heavily by Jean Piaget, Kegan developed a theory following humans' meaning making and social development through five stages: impulsive, imperial, interpersonal, institutional, and interindividual. In 1994, Kegan published a second